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Abstract
BACKGROUND: Distance protections are widely used in protection of energy transmission lines,
but their time coordination is still an important and diﬃcult problem. Inappropriate conﬁguration
leads to a hazard event: remote circuit breaker tripping provided the local circuit breaker can be
opened, which severely impairs power system operation.
OBJECTIVE: To describe a method and provide software tools to alleviate the hazard in power
systems.
METHODS: A domain speciﬁc language (DSL) for representation of a transmission line with its
distance protection schema, and a translation algorithm from the DSL to probabilistic fault trees
with time dependencies (PFTTDs) are employed.
RESULTS: The paper presents software tools that can support power protection experts in time
coordination of distance protections. The tools are based upon abstract and concrete syntax of the
DSL designed speciﬁcally for the purpose of the distance protection time coordination problem. In
order to render creation of power line and its protection schema models easier, a DSL-dedicated
editor supporting syntax and semantic aspects of the DSL has been developed. Additionally, a
translator from the DSL into PFTTD language has been implemented.
CONCLUSIONS: Power system experts are enabled to perform hazard probability assessment
and sensitivity analysis.
LIMITATIONS: Translation supports two types of distance protections, which are: single-system
relays with starting elements as well as multi-system relays without starting elements. For the
single-system relay, there is one timer per relay. For multi-system relays, there is one timer for each
of possibly many protection zones. Other types of protections, e.g. overcurrent are not considered.
1. Introduction
Distance protections are widely used in protec-
tion of energy transmission lines. The transmis-
sion line is divided into sections, whose bound-
aries are deﬁned by power stations. Because of
important consequences of faults like short cir-
cuits in high voltage transmission lines, a schema
with primary (local) and backup (remote) dis-
tance protections is applied. Section where fault
occurs is called the local section. Backup protec-
tion should disconnect the transmission line in
only when the local protection with its circuit
breaker has not done it beforehand. However, if
the backup protection reacts, then greater part of
transmission network is isolated compared with
the part disconnected by the local protection.
The hazard is the event: remote circuit breaker
tripping provided the local circuit breaker can
be opened.
For each distance protection, a set of zones,
e.g. Zone 1, Zone 2, Zone 3 is deﬁned to ap-
proximately point out fault occurring place. The
greater the zone number is, the greater part of
the line it covers.
Time coordination of primary and backup
protections is a signiﬁcant and diﬃcult problem.
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line, then the remote protection has to do it as
soon as possible. However, the remote one has
to wait for symptoms of line disconnection made
by the local one. The remote protection wait-
ing time (also known as time delay or tripping
time) for symptoms of local protection activity is
usually selected according to generally accepted
rules that are not adapted to particular cases.
These rules are based on the worst case analysis
with safety margin. According to these rules for
distance protections [1], time delays for Zone 2
are selected about 350ms, and about 800ms for
Zone 3. Therefore, the selected settings are not
optimal as far as the prompt fault clearance is
concerned.
Time coordination of distance protections
(relays) is a part of extensive research in the
ﬁeld of power systems. The approaches already
used are: Petri nets [2], linear programming [3,4],
evolutionary algorithms [5] and multi-agent sys-
tems [6]. In these papers, overcurrent protection
schemes are mainly analyzed. Distance protec-
tion cooperation with overcurrent protection is
considered in papers [4,7,8]. These papers do
not concern cooperation of distance protections.
Linear programming [3,4] and soft-computing
approaches [5,7] are used in order to solve the
relay coordination problem provided tripping
times (coordination intervals) are known. The
main diﬀerence between the above papers and
our approach is as follows. In [3–5,7] time delays
are supposed to be input data selected accord-
ingly to generally accepted rules. Our goal is such
selection of time delays for zones which is based
on parameters of: transmission line, source, load,
protections, and time characteristics.
Papers [9] and [10] show that time coordi-
nation of distance protections can be achieved
for signiﬁcantly smaller values than the recom-
mended ones by using respectively: fault trees
with time dependencies (FTTDs) and probabilis-
tic fault trees with time dependencies (PFTTDs).
In FTTD [9] time parameters are speciﬁed in
a non-deterministic way by their minimal and
maximal values. On the contrary, in PFTTD [10]
time parameters are characterized by random
variables. Models of the following time parame-
ters have to be found: entrance (exit) times of
impedance into (from) characteristics of diﬀer-
ent zones of protections for diﬀerent locations
of fault, circuit breaker opening time. In the
present paper the following distance protection
coordination process is proposed.
1. Deﬁne scopes of distance protections zones
of the power line in question.
2. Specify the power subsystem and its protec-
tions in a domain speciﬁc language (DSL).
3. Translate the DSL-based model into FTTD
(or PFTTD).
4. Determine time parameters from the real sys-
tem or simulation experiments involving e.g.
the EMTP utility [11].
5. Find the time delay for each zone of each pro-
tection using analytic bounds for FTTD [9]
or by simulation for PFTTD [10].
Structures of both trees obtained in point 3. are
the same. Time parameters are diﬀerent only.
When time parameters are calculated using
simulation program, then the following power
system features have to be taken into account
in the evaluation: resistance and reactance of
transmission line, source impedance, types of
simulated faults, fault resistance, loads, fault lo-
cations over the line, impedance characteristics
for protection zones. In the present paper two
distance protection types are considered, namely:
– single-system relays with starting elements,
– multi-system relays without starting ele-
ments.
For the single-system relay there is one timer.
For multi-system relays the format of distance
relays is the full distance scheme without starting
elements, i.e., delays are timed individually for
each zone. Relatively long operation time in Zone
1, the fundamental one, is a severe disadvantage
of single-system relays. Therefore, in high volt-
age networks, and extra high voltage networks in
particular, multi-system protections are applied
instead.
Time coordination of multi-system distance
protections using PFTTD has been considered
in [10], whereas using FTTD in [9]. Time coordi-
nation of single-system protections with starting
elements using FTTD has been studied in [12].
For diﬀerent protection types, PFTTD of
diﬀerent structure is constructed. The outputTime coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 9
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Figure 1. A three-section transmission line with protections, their zones and timing [10]
model diﬀerences arise from the aforementioned
variety of distance protections supported, each of
which ﬁnally could possibly disconnect the power
line fragment. Since power lines with mixed dis-
tance protection types are common, the DSL to
PFTTD translation should seamlessly integrate
diﬀerent model fragments to correctly capture
the hazard. In the present paper, PFTTD mod-
els are considered. Although they have the same
structure as FTTD models, they are probabilistic
by nature, whereas the latter ones express time
parameters in the non-deterministic way.
Although building a new domain language
requires substantial development eﬀort, the cost
is quickly returned by providing work eﬃciency
unapproachable to generic solutions. In fact, none
of general purpose modeling languages may reach
level of intuitiveness provided by a domain one,
which has been designed speciﬁcally to support
some particular domain, which in this case is
time coordination of power system protections.
So, by means of the DSL power system experts
may build and optimize models using their own
technical vocabulary without familiarizing them-
selves with computer engineering concepts.
Contrary to a general language, which in-
herently is a trade-oﬀ between requirements of
various domains, taking precise semantics oﬀered
by a DSL for granted allows to build software
engineering tools more eﬀectively accomplishing
their tasks, like the PFTTD generation. Had the
goal been achieved with some generic solution,
it would have involved not only a more verbose
transformation, but also implicit restrictions of
the generic language used. This is for reasons
of intuitiveness and precision that domain lan-
guages win acceptance of engineers.
Structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, distance protection schema of a power
transmission line composed of three sequential
sections is outlined. In the next two sections,
abstract and concrete syntax models of the DSL
are presented. In Section 5, abstract syntax of
PFTTD language is given. Next, PFTTD mod-
els for power lines with mixed protection types
are presented. In Section 7, the transformation
from DSL to PFTTD with few PFTTD models
is described. The last section recapitulates the
research.
2. Distance protection
The ultimate goal of distance protection schema
depicted in Fig. 1 is selectivity, i.e. only those Cir-
cuit Breakers (CBs) that are required to isolate
a fault (short circuit) are opened.
A notation used in Fig. 1 is as follows: Si,
where i ∈ {1,2,3}, is section,
Pi, where i ∈ {1,2,3}, is the protection placed
on the left-hand side of section Si,
Zij, where i ∈ {1,2,3} and j ∈ {1,2,3} , is j-th
zone of protection Pi.
In the paper faults located by protections in
section S1 are considered. According to the zones
shown in Fig. 1, the a1, a2, b and c subsections
can be distinguished for the S1 section, whereas
a,b and c for S2.10 Marcin Kowalski, Jan Magott
Let us suppose that the fault is located by
the P1 protection in the Z11 zone, i.e. a part
of S1 composed of subsections a1, a2, and b. In
this case, the P1 protection that is close to the
left-hand side of S1 should trip its CB1. The P1
is a primary protection and triggering its breaker
turns S1 oﬀ. It is possible, however, that a faulty
operation of either P1 or CB1 may occur. If the
fault occurs, then the remote backup protections
P2 and sometimes P3 should trip CB2 and CB3
respectively. In this case, however, the remote
section S2 or even S3 are turned oﬀ.
The P2 protection operates in three zones.
Zone Z21 covers 80% of S2. Zone Z22 contains S2
and half of S1. Zone Z23 covers both sections and
20% of the section which is the right neighbor of
S1. The a1 subsection is covered by the Z33 zone
of P3. This subsection is also covered by zones
Z11, Z12, Z13. Hence, this subsection is covered
by six zones of three protections altogether. The
c subsection, on the other hand, is covered by
three zones Z12, Z13, and Z23. These zones are
used to roughly recognize a fault location. Find-
ing the zone where fault has occurred is based
on measurements of impedance of transmission
line from the place of protection mounting to the
fault location. Protections trip after Tij, where
i ∈ {1,2,3} and j ∈ {1,2,3}, which is a time de-
lay of j-th zone of protection Pi. If P2 recognizes
a fault in the Z2j zone, where j ∈ {1,2,3}, then
after time delay T2j, P2 sends signal to CB2 in
order to open it. Graded times of the tripping
delays for zones of Pi, where i ∈ {1,2,3}, are
used (Ti1 < Ti2 < Ti3), i.e. the greater number of
the zone, the greater time delay. For the Zi1 zone,
the time delay of the start of the CBi tripping is
usually equal to zero.
Two distance protection types are considered,
namely:
– single-system relays with starting elements
and one timer,
– multi-system relays without starting elements
and with one timer for each zone.
Let us explain protection schema assumed for
single-system protection with starting element.
In analysis performed in the paper, each dis-
tance protection with starting element has one
timer for each protection. The following protec-
tion schema is assumed. There are impedance
characteristics: Starting, Zone 1, Zone 2, and
Zone 3. The Starting impedance characteristic
contains Zone 3, and Zone i characteristic, where
i ∈ {2,3}, contains Zone (i-1) one, i.e. there is
decreasing order of characteristic areas.
Let τ be time instant when the fault started.
An algorithm for protection with starting ele-
ments is as follows:
if the starting element of the protection recognized
that measured impedance entered Starting
impedance characteristic at instant τ
then the timer is set to τ + T1;
if impedance is in Zone 1 impedance characteristic
at instant τ + T1
then tripping signal is sent to the CB at instant
τ + T1
else at instant τ + T1 the timer is set to τ + T2;
if impedance is in Zone 2 characteristic at instant
τ + T2
then at instant τ + T2 tripping signal is sent to
the CB
else at instant τ + T2 the timer is set to τ + T3 ;
if impedance is in Zone 3 characteristic at instant
τ + T3
then at instant τ + T3 tripping signal is sent to
the CB.
The goal is to derive statistical relations be-
tween time settings for protection zones of pro-
tection and the hazard probability. To carry out
investigations, information on operating time of
distance relay with respect to fault occurring
instant, as well as on dropout time with respect
to fault clearance instant are required.
Probability distribution functions of entrance
time to and exit time from all concerned zones
for protections P1, P2, and P3, under assump-
tion of faults located by relays in subsections
a1, a2, b, c of section S1 and subsections a, b, c
of section S2 have to be known (Fig. 1). They
can be obtained by measurements of real system
or simulation experiments using, e.g. EMTP. In
the paper, these times are expressed by random
variables denoted as Tiej|kf entrance time to (exit
time from) impedance characteristics of the Zone
j for the protection Pi, where:
– i ∈ {1,2,3} number of protection Pi,
– e ∈ {en,ex} where en (or: ex) stands for the
entrance time to (or: the exit time from) the
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– j ∈ {1,2,3,S} number of Zone j or S for
starting zone of protection Pi, under assump-
tion: the fault is located by relay (protection)
in section k and its subsection f, where
– k ∈ {1,2} number of section,
– f ∈ {a,b,c,d} name of subsection.
3. Abstract syntax of the domain
speciﬁc language for heterogeneous
power line protection systems
The need to successfully conduct sensitivity anal-
ysis of the hazard accounts for development of
a language capable of describing distance pro-
tections. Then, on the basis of models expressed
in that language, PFTTD may be automatically
produced and analyzed. To properly support the
process, the language should consists of abstract
and concrete syntax, which will be analyzed in
the current and next section.
As Fig. 2 indicates, these are sections and pro-
tections that comprise any power line. Sections
are in turn further divided into subsections, and
each of them has the factor attribute assigned
that is determining its length in relation to the
containing section. Therefore, the PowerLine,
Section and Subsection classes along with their
containment hierarchy lay the foundations of
designing protections, which is performed using
classes for the remaining metamodel.
Consequently, a number of protections and
their circuit breakers (represented by the
Protection and CircuitBreaker classes) are
found in the metamodel. Since a breaker is trig-
gered by the protection when a fault is found in
one of its zones, the cb and zones associations
have been added to specify these objects.
For the protection to trip the breaker, the
timing constraints for a particular subsection
must are met. This is why every zone works
in the range of a few subsections speciﬁed by
objects of the SubSectionProtection class and
its subsection association. A set of random vari-
ables is then necessary to perform hazard analy-
sis. When some protection is local with respect
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to the subsection it protects (i.e. the subsec-
tion belongs to the same section the protection
is located in), only entryTime and delayTime
are needed to run the transformation and sim-
ulate the model (see Section 2). Otherwise, if
the protection is remote, exitTime must be ad-
ditionally deﬁned to correctly capture hazard
dependencies. The RandV ar class abstracts the
variety of probability distributions that random
variables may conform to. Logarithmic-normal
distribution (LogNormal) has been found to
ﬁt well when modeling entry times (denoted by
the entryTime reference in Fig. 2) and circuit
breaker opening times (offTime) [13].
Compared with [14], the language has
been refactored to comply with requirements
of the transformation supporting heteroge-
neous distance protections. As a result, us-
ing enumerations such as StartingElement or
ProtectionSystem, power system experts may
indicate presence or absence of a starting ele-
ment, and whether the protection consists of one
or many parts.
In order to investigate the hazard probability
correctly when a starting element is on the run,
a starting zone of a protection must be indicated.
This is modeled as a non-containment reference,
since all the zones are stored in the zones asso-
ciation.
4. Concrete syntax of the domain
speciﬁc language for heterogeneous
power line protection systems
A language may be considered domain speciﬁc
when domain experts are enabled to conveniently
deﬁne systems they operate on in this language.
Hence, the power system language abstract syn-
tax should be accompanied with concrete syntax,
from which an actual editor could be generated.
This way, power system experts have to under-
stand neither object oriented paradigms, nor in-
ternals of the language they use, which otherwise
would limit intuitiveness of the approach.
Generally, there are two ways of combin-
ing abstract with concrete syntax [15]. First,
the abstract syntax could be derived automat-
ically from concrete syntax by means of ﬁxed
metamodel-level translation. However, keeping
the distance protection to fault tree model trans-
formation in mind, full control of the abstract
syntax is retained in this paper by incorporating
the second approach. Having deﬁned the abstract
syntax, concrete syntax is built by referencing
objects and their relationships in the grammar
rules. This way we managed to keep the trans-
lation robust and independent from the actual
user representation of the model.
The EMFText [15] tool from the Eclipse
Platform was used to design and produce con-
crete syntax, but feasibility study showed that
the Xtext [16] tool would have been also useful.
By turning the abstract syntax into a focal point
of development, both tools could be even used
simultaneously.
The grammar deﬁnition language is an ex-
tension of Backus-Naur Form consisting of rules,
each starting with a rule name and ending with
a semicolon (for example lines 2–3 from Listing
1). Each rule name refers to some concrete class
called alike in the distance protection metamodel
(Fig. 2). Moreover, rules are deﬁned using tokens
and class features (attributes or references from
Fig2) from the metamodel. When a parser enters
the rule, it creates a new object conforming to
the proper class from the metamodel. It then ﬁll
values of attributes and references according to
the following tokens.
For example, as line 26 in Listing 1 suggests,
when a parser stumbles across the ‘Section’ to-
ken, it creates a new instance of the Section
class. Next, the parser expects to ﬁnd the name
attribute value, followed by an opening curly
brace. The subSection literal comes from the
Section class drawn in Fig. 2. At that point, it
notiﬁes the parser to invoke (possibly many times
due to the ‘+’ character) the rule for SubSection
and add newly created objects describing sub-
sections to the aforementioned association. Once
again for another rule, as line 28 indicates, the
parser expects now the ‘SubSection’ token fol-
lowed by the name attribute value, the ‘Factor’
token and the factor attribute value. There may
be many SubSection objects, but once a closing
curly brace is found, the Section is complete.Time coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 13
When a similar analysis will be started from the
‘PowerLine’ rule to the last possible rule, the re-
sulting hierarchy will constitute a tree spanning
the metamodel. As a result, the parser will create
a complete distance protection model designed
by a power system expert.
To be more speciﬁc about rule deﬁnitions,
when some feature is an attribute, its name is al-
ways followed by square brackets with an optional
type attribute written inside the brackets. On
the other hand, when some feature is a reference
and its name is followed by brackets, the parser
will assign to it some already existing object with
the name attribute equal to the user typed token
at that place. When some feature is a reference
and is not followed by brackets, a new object will
be created. Compare the subSection reference
in the ‘SubSectionProtection’ rule (line 36 in
Listing 1) with a S1a1 subsection protected by
Zone Z33 (line 28 in Listing 2). The latter listing
shows also a deﬁnition of the concrete syntax for
heterogeneous power line protection systems.
Listing 1. The DSL concrete syntax deﬁnition
1 RULES{
2 PowerLine::= "PowerLine" name [ ] "{" " CircuitBreakerTypes " "{" cbTypes+ "}"
3 " Sections " "{" sections+ "}" " Protections " "{" protections+ "}" "}" ;
4
5 CircuitBreakerType ::= "CBType" name [ ] "OffTime" offTime ;
6
7 WeibullRandVar::= " Weibull " "{" " scale " " : " scale [FLOAT]
8 "Shape" " : " shape [FLOAT] "}" ;
9
10 ExpRandVar::= "Exp" "{" "Lambda" " : " lambda [FLOAT] "}" ;
11
12 SPRandVar::= "SP" "{" "R" " : " r [INT] "}" ;
13
14 ErlangRandVar::= " Erlang " "{" "K" " : " k [INT]
15 "Lambda" " : " lambda [INT] "}" ;
16
17 LogNormalRandVar::= "LogNormal" "{" " Scale " " : " scale [FLOAT]
18 "Shape" " : " shape [FLOAT] "}" ;
19
20 LogLogisticRandVar ::= " LogLogistic " "{" "Alpha" " : " alpha [FLOAT]
21 "Beta" " : " beta [FLOAT] "}" ;
22
23 NonparametricRandVar::= "Nonparametric" "{"
24 "Histogram" " : " filePath [ ] "}" ;
25
26 Section ::= " Section " name [ ] "{" subSections+ "}" ;
27
28 SubSection ::= " SubSection " name [ ] " Factor " factor [INT] ;
29
30 Protection ::= " Protection " name [ ] "{" cb zones+
31 "System" system [ ] " StartingElement " startingElement [ ]
32 ( " StartingZone " startingZone [ ] ) ? "}" ;
33
34 Zone::= "Zone" name [ ] "{" subSectionProtections+ "}" ;
35
36 SubSectionProtection ::= " SubSection " subSection [ ]
37 "{" "EntryTime" entryTime ( "ExitTime" exitTime )?
38 ( "DelayTime" delayTime)? "}" ;
39
40 CircuitBreaker ::= " CircuitBreaker " name [ ] "Type" type [ ] ;
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Let us consider P1, P2 and P3 protections
of the a1 subsection contained in the S1 section
in Fig. 1. Protections P1, P3 are multi-system,
whereas P2 is one-system. A model deﬁned in
Listing 2 uses the language from Listing 1, so
that the grammar parser can bind rules and
eventually create the object model (an instance
of Fig. 2) that will become subject of transfor-
mation described in the next section.
So, the PowerLine block is started ﬁrst.
Then come parts for types of circuit breakers
(CircuitBreakersTypes), which are further ref-
erenced while describing protections. Power line
structure (i.e. Section and SubSection rules)
is deﬁned next. Finally, the three protections
are described inside the Protections block in
the following way. For each zone controlled by
the protection, a set of subsections is referenced
to assign EntryTime, DelayTime and possibly
ExitTime values. For the sake of simplicity, only
parts of the a1 subsection are given in this exam-
ple. Timing parameters are equal to 0, because
EMTP simulator has not been run yet.
Listing 2. A sample model expressed in the DSL for subsection a1 of S1, where protections P1, P3
are multi-system, whereas P2 is one-system
1 PowerLine powerLine1 {
2 CircuitBreakerTypes {
3 CircuitBreakerType typeA OffTime LogNormal { Scale : 0 Shape: 0 }
4 }
5 Sections {
6 Section S3 {
7 SubSection S3a Factor 80
8 SubSection S3b Factor 20
9 }
10 Section S2 {
11 SubSection S2a Factor 50
12 SubSection S2b Factor 30
13 SubSection S2c Factor 20
14 }
15 Section S1 {
16 SubSection S1a1 Factor 20
17 SubSection S1a2 Factor 30
18 SubSection S1b Factor 30
19 SubSection S1c Factor 20
20 }
21 }
22 Protections {
23 Protection P3 {
24 CircuitBreaker CB3 Type typeA
25 . . .
26 Zone Z_33{
27 . . .
28 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
29 ExitTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 } DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
30 }
31 System Multi
32 StartingElement Absent
33 }
34 Protection P2 {
35 CircuitBreaker CB2 Type typeA
36 . . .
37 Zone Z_22{
38 . . .
39 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
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41 }
42 Zone Z_23{
43 . . .
44 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
45 ExitTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 } DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
46 }
47 Zone Z_2S {
48 . . .
49 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 } }
50 }
51 System Single
52 StartingElement Present
53 StartingZone Z_2S
54 }
55 Protection P1 {
56 CircuitBreaker CB1 Type typeA
57 Zone Z11{
58 . . .
59 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
60 DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
61 }
62 Zone Z_12{
63 . . .
64 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
65 DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
66 }
67 Zone Z_13{
68 . . .
69 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
70 DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
71 }
72 System Multi
73 StartingElement Absent
74 }}}
All in all, the S1a1 subsection is protected
in 6 zones: Z33, Z22, Z23, Z11, Z12 and Z13.
The Z22 and Z23 zones are protected by the P2
protection, so their work is driven by the starting
element.
The second example discussed in the follow-
ing sections diﬀers from the ﬁrst one in the P3
Protection conﬁguration, so now it is one-system
with starting element (Listing 3). First of all, a
new zone Z3S is added (lines 9-13). To indicate
that the zone is starting line 16 has been added.
Changes made in lines 14-15 notify the transfor-
mation to build a PFTTD for a single-system
protection with a starting element.
Listing 3. The sample model with the P3 protection being one-system with starting element
1 Protection P3 {
2 CircuitBreaker CB3 Type typeA
3 . . .
4 Zone Z33{
5 . . .
6 SubSection S1a1 { EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 }
7 ExitTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 } DelayTime SP {R: 0} }
8 }
9 Zone Z3S{
10 . . .
11 SubSection S1a1 {EntryTime Erlang { K: 0 Lambda: 0 } }
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13 System Single
14 StartingElement Present
15 StartingZone Z3S
16 }
One possible application of modeling the
same line with two diﬀerent protection schema is
to evaluate impact of protection modernization
on the hazard. Diﬀerences in the two hazard
scenarios will be analyzed in the subsequent sec-
tions.
5. The language of probabilistic fault
trees with time dependencies
The PFTTDs (modeled by the FaultTree class
in Fig. 3) are bipartite graphs with a single node
denoted to be the root, which usually speciﬁes
the hazard event. An object of the FaultTree
class contains objects of classes such as Node
and Edge, which are both further specialized
by the notions related to the fault tree lan-
guage. These are Event and Gate which con-
stitute the two types of bipartite graph nodes.
Objects of those classes are connected through
EventOutput- and GateOutput- edges. The ﬁrst
ones start with events and end with gates (the
one drawn between E7 and G1 in Fig. 5 for ex-
ample), whereas the latter ones start with gates
and end with events (the one drawn between G1
and E1).
The second part of the language depicted in
Fig. 4 reﬁnes the PFTTD gates, which can be
causal or generalization. Names of gates consist
of two parts. The ﬁrst letter denotes a kind of
gate (C for causal and G for generalization) and
the remaining part deﬁnes preconditions for a
gate to start its output event. The AND, OR and
NOT types relate to the classical logic, whereas
PAND generates output when both input event
occur and the left one occurred as ﬁrst. Delay
gates, which are denoted by an hour-glass symbol,
operate like CXOR gates with a single input by
introducing random variable-based time delay
between input and output events.
6. Discussion of a generated
probabilistic fault trees with time
dependencies
Although details of the DSL to PFTTD trans-
lation will be explained in the next section on
the grounds of some speciﬁc model cases, in this
section discussion of the output model (Fig. 5
from transformation of the a1 subsection of S1
section from Fig. 1) will follow.
Probabilistic Fault Tree with Time Depen-
dencies (PFTTD) analysis starts with identi-
fying hazards, which is the event: remote cir-
cuit breaker tripping provided the local circuit
breaker can be opened and faults are located by
relays in the a1 subsection. For each hazard, a
PFTTD is created.
Let us make the following assumption regard-
ing fault occurrence.
Assumption 1: At most one fault can occur dur-
ing analysis interval, and once it happens, it is
permanent.
Types of protections are as follows:
P1, P3 - multi-system without starting elements,
and with one timer per each zone,
P2 - single-system with starting elements, and
with one timer per one protection.
According to requirements speciﬁcation, if
there is a fault in S1, and additionally P1 and
the local breaker CB1 are operational, then only
S1 should be disconnected. The hazard is event
E1: remote circuit breaker (CB2 or CB3) tripping
provided the local CB1 can be opened. Hence,
the hazard happens when excessively large part
of the power network is isolated. The PFTTD
for this hazard and fault located by relays in
section S1 and its subsection a1 generated by
the translator is illustrated in Fig. 5. The tree
contains parts that are similar to the ones for
multi-system protection [10] and fragments sim-
ilar to those for single-system protections [12].Time coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 17
Figure 3. The core part of the PFTTD language
Figure 4. Causal and generalization gates of the PFTTD language18 Marcin Kowalski, Jan Magott
Figure 5. A PFTTD for the ﬁrst example: fault located by relays in the a1 subsection of S1 section, which is
guarded by P1, P3 - multi-system protections without starting elements, and P2 - single-system with starting
element.
Event E1 occurs if at least one delay time
(T33,T23,T22) is too small, i.e. at least one of the
E7, E10 or E16 events has occurred. Hence, the
hazard occurs, if at least one remote protection
time delay for zones Z22 or Z23 of protection P2,
or zone Z33 of P3 has been set incorrectly. Time
delay between start instant of event E7, E10 or
E16 and start instant of event E1 is equal to 0.
Hence, delays for all inputs of gate G7 are equal
to 0.
Let τ(Eis) denote instant when event Ei
has started. Some events may stop immediately,
where others last longer. For G6, if event E7
has occurred then event E6 had occurred not
later than the E8 event, i.e. the start of E6
had occurred not later than the start of E8, so
τ(E6s)<τ(E8s). In this case, P3 trips its CB3.
Turning oﬀ process will not be stopped, and CB3
will be opened. In this case, tripping of CB3 will
be prior to detection of fault clearance symptoms.Time coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 19
Hence, the P3 relay has reacted too early, what
caused that the hazard event E7 has occurred. In
order to avoid the hazard, the following condition:
τ(E8s)<τ(E6s) has to be satisﬁed. Additionally,
if CB1 of P1 is not opened, then the P3 will
not detect that CB1 is opened. Hence, the E8
event does not occur, and consequently neither
does the hazard. On the other hand, let us sup-
pose that the P3 had observed that the CB1
is opened (event E8) before time delay T33 has
passed, so P3 will not turn oﬀ its CB3. Hence,
event E7 does not occur (the hazard does not
occur).
Let us consider a sub-tree with the E7 event
as the root. In this sub-tree, the part with the
E6 event concerns the P3 protection and its zone
Z33, while the right sub-tree with E8 concerns
P1. In sub-tree with event E16 as the root, the
part with the E19 event is related to P2 and its
zone Z22, while part with E17 is associated with
opening activity of CB1 by P1.
If there is a fault in subsection a1 of S1 then
impedance seen by P3 can be inside operating
characteristics of Z33. In this case impedance
seen by P2 can be inside characteristics of Z22
or Z23. Hence, tripping of CB3 can be started
after time delay T33 from instant the impedance
entered characteristic of Z33. Time T33 is the
time from start instant of event E5 till start
instant of event E6. The tripping of CB2 can be
started after time delays T22, T23, respectively,
from instant the impedance entered impedance
characteristic of the Starting zone Z2S of P2,
provided the impedance remains in characteris-
tics of Z22, Z23. These times are given by real
numbers, and are represented by delays of the
G9, G15 gates associated with E14 event.
Impedance trajectory measured by P2 enters
characteristics of Z2S after time T2enS|1a1 rela-
tively to instant τ being start of the fault. This
time is the parameter of the G13 delay gate. If
the fault in subsection a1 of S1 occurred at time
instant τ and it still lasts then the impedance
seen by P3 enters characteristics of Z33 at instant
τ +T3en3|1a1. Time T3en3|1a1 is the delay of delay
gate G4. Times T2en2|1a1, T2en3|1a1 respectively,
associated with P2 are the time delays of the
gates G8, G14.
Trajectory of the impedance seen by P3 exits
from characteristics of Z33 after time T3ex3|1a1
since separation of CB1 contacts. This time is
the delay of gate G7. CB1 tripping lasts the time
given by random variable TOff (Fig. 5). Hence,
delay of gate G2 (time between start instant of
event E3 and start instant of event E4) is equal
to TOff.
If there is a fault in a1 of S1 then impedance
seen by P1 can be inside operating characteris-
tics of Z11, Z12 or Z13. Hence, CB1 tripping can
be started either immediately, or after time T12,
or after T13, relatively to the instant when the
impedance seen by P1 entered characteristic for
Z11, Z12 or Z13 respectively. Therefore, three
times, namely T11 = 0, T12 or T13 are delays of
the G3 COR gate. They are all equal to time
intervals between start instants of input events
E20, E21, E22 of this gate and start instant of
the E3 output event. Entry times of impedance
into characteristics for zones Z11, Z12 and Z13 of
P1 are random variables T1en1|1a1, T1en2|1a1 and
T1en3|1a1 respectively. These random variables
characterize delays of the G19, G20, G21 delay
gates.
Detailed explanation of fault trees with time
dependencies for single-system protection with
starting elements can be found in [12], while
explanation of probabilistic fault trees with time
dependencies for multi-system protection is given
in [10].
7. A power line protection DSL to
PFTTD transformation
According to the procedure proposed in the In-
troduction, the third step of hazard analysis is
to translate a domain model into PFTTD. The
translation in question is discussed below.
Generation of output models takes place in
three phases. The ﬁrst one produces a fault tree
skeleton and is protection independent. In the
second phase, the skeleton is supplemented with
elements generated from local protections guard-
ing a subsection. Finally, parts related to re-
mote protections are created. The procedures
described below (or mappings in the Query View20 Marcin Kowalski, Jan Magott
Transformation parlance [17]) constitute the sec-
ond and third phase and are run iteratively for
each protection guarding the subsection.
The skeleton of every model consists of the
E1, E2, E3 and E4 events along with G1, G2 and
G3 gates (see Fig. 5). These parts are common
among any produced models and describe the
fault, hazard and breaker tripping performed by
the local protection. Depending upon type and
placement of subsection’s protections, modiﬁca-
tions will be applied to the resulting fault tree.
When a local protection without a starting
element is employed, time to trigger the breaker
depends on zone entry time as well as on a delib-
erately introduced delay (possibly 0). Hence, the
missing part between the E2 event and G3 gate
is composed of: a delay gate, event and delay
variable assigned to the G3 gate. For example,
G19, E20 and T13 in Fig. 5.
Presence of a starting element, however, sub-
stitutes that model fragment with the one pre-
sented in Fig. 6. The tripping process is altered in
such a way that impedance must enter character-
istic of a protecting zone (E23) before (E22), so
it enters the starting zone (E25) and awaits the
delay of the G22 gate. The translation process of
this PFTTD model fragment will be discussed on
the basis of code snippet presented in Listing 4.
As the name of the localProtectionWithSe
mapping suggests (line 10), it produces a set
of PFTTD elements related to the operation of
a local protection driven by a starting element.
They all ﬁt between the line fault event (E2)
and the COR gate (G3), hence the mapping’s
arguments. The class name after the query or
mapping keywords (e.g. line 1 or 10) indicates
the execution context, i.e. a class of the self
local variable speciﬁc to a particular mapping in-
vocation. Moreover, in this case the mapping can
be executed only when the isLocal and hasSe
queries both return the logical truth (lines 10-11),
which is when the mapping is applicable. Oth-
erwise, some other mappings (not listed) are
executed.
The ﬁrst query (lines 1-3) traverses the dis-
tance protection model to ﬁnd out whether
the starting element has been indicated by a
user. The second query checks if the protection
that the subsection protection (self) belongs to
(right-hand operand in line 9) is the same as the
local protection of the subsection being analyzed
(left-hand side operand).
Three events are created in lines 13-20.
For example, the E22 event, delayElapsed
was generated using the delayElapsed vari-
able. Similarly, impInZone is E23 and
impInZoneBeforeDelay is E24. Arguments of
the event constructor (not shown) are expressions
wrapped in some Latex tags using the stroke and
latexText queries (not shown).
Next, the G21, G22 and G23 gates are
created, in that order, in lines 22-24. Then,
starting from line 26 up to 37 are all the
aforementioned elements are bound together
by the GateOutputEdge and EventOutputEdge
objects. In each case, the ﬁrst constructor argu-
ment is the source element, and the second is
target. Finally, the starting element part, whose
creation will be discussed shortly, is connected
with the gate represented by delay variable (lines
36-37).
The ﬁnal part of the mapping is the assign-
ment of correct random variables. When the
starting element is present, all random variables
of the COR gate should be equal 0 (line 39).
Contrary, entry time of the subsection protection
should be transferred from the DSL model, which
is performed by the toEntryTime mapping (not
shown). When it comes to delay values (lines
41-42), only a new random variable is created
without assigning its distribution. It should be
ﬁlled manually by a domain expert while analyz-
ing the resulting PFTTD.
Special attention should be paid to the
StartingElement mapping invoked in lines
36-37, whose code is listed in lines 45-59. It is re-
sponsible of creating the G24 and E25 elements,
which specify how a starting element operates.
This mapping has returned, for example, the E25
event initialized in lines 48-51. Next, the Delay
gate is created and initialized. When assigning its
timing parameters (lines 53-55), the respective
starting element description is searched over the
collection of entry times to the starting zone.
Newly created elements are ﬁnally connected in
lines 57 and 58.Time coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 21
Figure 6. The local circuit breaker tripping by the single-system protection with starting element
Listing 4. A QVT mapping for translation of a single system protection with a starting element
1 query SubSectionProtection : : hasSe () : Boolean {
2 return self . zone . protection . startingElement = StartingElement : : Present ;
3 }
4
5 query SubSectionProtection : : isLocal () : Boolean {
6 return self . subSection . localProtection () = self . zone . protection ;
7 }
8
9
10 mapping SubSectionProtection : : localProtectionWithSe ( in lineFault : Event ,
11 inout cbTripping : COR) when { self . hasSe () and self . isLocal ()}{
12
13 var delayElapsed:= new Event( stroke ( "T_{" +
14 self . zone . protection . protectionNo () +
15 self . zone . zoneNo () + "}" ) + latexText ( " elapsed " ));
16 var impdInZone:= new Event( latexText ( "Imp. in " ) + stroke ( self . zone .name ));
17
18 var impInZoneBeforeDelay:= new Event( latexText ( "Imp. in " ) + stroke ( self . zone .name)+
19 newLine () + latexText ( " before " ) + stroke ( "T_{" + self . zone .
20 protection . protectionNo () + self . zone . zoneNo () + "}" ) + latexText ( " elapsed " ));22 Marcin Kowalski, Jan Magott
21
22 var entry:= new Delay ();
23 var delay:= new Delay ();
24 var order:= new CPAND();
25
26 new GateOutputEdge( delay , delayElapsed );
27 new GateOutputEdge( order , impInZoneBeforeDelay );
28 new EventOutputEdge( impInZoneBeforeDelay , cbTripping );
29
30 new EventOutputEdge( lineFault , entry );
31 new GateOutputEdge( entry , impdInZone );
32
33 new EventOutputEdge(impdInZone , order );
34 new EventOutputEdge( delayElapsed , order );
35
36 new EventOutputEdge( self . subSection .map
37 StartingElement ( self . zone . protection , lineFault ) , delay );
38
39 cbTripping . delays += new RandomVariable( "0" );
40 entry . delays:= Sequence { self .map toEntryTime ()};
41 delay . delays += new RandomVariable( stroke ( "T_{" + self . zone . protection .
42 protectionNo () + self . zone . zoneNo()+"}" ));
43 }
44
45 mapping SubSection : : StartingElement ( in protection : Protection ,
46 in lineFault : Event ): Event {
47
48 init {
49 result := new Event( latexText ( "Imp. in " ) + stroke ( "Z_" +
50 protection . protectionNo () + "S" ));
51 }
52 var faultInZoneS := new Delay ();
53 faultInZoneS . delays := Sequence{protection . startingZone .
54 subSectionProtections−>select (e | e . subSection = self)−>
55 f i r s t ().map toSeEntryTime ()};
56
57 new EventOutputEdge( lineFault , faultInZoneS );
58 new GateOutputEdge( faultInZoneS , result );
59 }
Independently of the local protection type,
the main goal of the second phase is to reﬁne E3,
being the circuit breaker tripping event, which
is referred to in the last step.
The hazard results from competitions be-
tween the local breaker tripping and each of
remote protections, which may interrupt too soon
some excessively large line area before the local
protection will disconnect the local breaker. The
third phase binds E4 with E1 in a way dependent
on presence of a starting element.
When there is no starting element, the struc-
ture such as E5, E6, E7 and E8 is constructed
similarly to Fig. 5. However, as described by the
end of Section 4, in the second example, protec-
tion P3 was turned into a single-system with a
starting element. The transformation correctly
captured that change and produced a new model
fragment with E5, E6, E7, E8 and E9 as shown
in Fig. 7.
Furthermore, depending on the real system
conﬁguration, protections may be placed either
at the beginning of the section (as in Fig. 1) or
at its end (as in Fig. 8). Sometimes protections
are located at both sides of a section. By ana-
lyzing the hazard probability for the model with
reverted zones, power system experts may decide
on redesigning the real system. Figure 9 depicts
the results of transforming the system deﬁned
in Fig. 8 for the a2 subsection in the S3 section.Time coordination of heterogeneous distance protections using a domain speciﬁc language 23
Figure 7. A PFTTD for the a1 subsection in S1 section, which is guarded by: P1 - multi-system protection
without starting elements, P2, P3 - single-system with starting element.24 Marcin Kowalski, Jan Magott
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Figure 8. A three-section transmission line with protections placed at the sections’ ends
Originally there were no remote protections for
this subsection, so no redundant safety measures
were taken in the case of fault. According to new
protection schema, however, two zones of remote
protection P2 additionally guard the area and
hazard estimation is possible owing to model
drawn in Figure 9.
8. Final remarks
The new domain speciﬁc language for represen-
tation of a transmission line with its distance
protection schema accompanied by the translator
to probabilistic fault trees with time dependen-
cies were designed, implemented and veriﬁed.
The veriﬁcation was run for diﬀerent protec-
tion schemes. Two types of distance protections:
single-system relays with starting elements as
well as multi-system relays without starting ele-
ments were analyzed. Additionally, protections
were located at both ends of the section.
Since structures of FTTD models for distance
protection are the same as those conforming to
the PFTTD metamodel, the translator might be
also employed to the non-deterministic models.
In the DSL, protection schema for line with
transformer can be expressed according to pa-
per [9], and the translator can be used for sections
with transformer too.
The resulting fault tree proves its usefulness
in:
– communication of the risk analysis outcome
between power system experts
– simulation
– hazard sensitivity analysis by means of alter-
ing protection schema
– hazard sensitivity analysis due to upgrade of
protection type.
The last step of the distance protection coordina-
tion process proposed in Introduction, i.e. model
simulation, requires respective tooling. Software
capable of handling PFTTDs generated from the
DSL was described in [18].
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